Wasatch County v. E. Ray Okelberry, Brian Okelberry, Erick Okelberry, West Daniels Land : Amicus Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Wasatch County v. E. Ray Okelberry, Brian
Okelberry, Erick Okelberry, West Daniels Land :
Amicus Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Mark Ward; Attorney for Respondent.
Don R. Petersen; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis, and Petersen; Attorneys for Petitioners.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Wasatch County v. E. Ray Okelberry, No. 20070011 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/9
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, a body politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
E. RAY OKELBERRY, BRIAN 
OKELBERRY, ERIC OKELBERRY, 
WEST DANIELS LAND 
ASSOCIATION, UTAH DIVISION OF 
WILDLIFE RESOURCES, 
Defendants and Petitioners, 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE UTAH 
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
WASATCH COUNTY 
Case No. 20070011 
On Writ of Certiorari from the Ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, 153 P.3d 745 
J. Mark Ward #4436 
Utah Association of Counties 
5397 South Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 801-265-1331 
Facsimile: 801-265-9485 
Attorney for Utah Association of 
Counties 
UTAH 
A P P & C O U R T S 
JUL U Wl 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2 
ARGUMENT 4 
A. Competent Evidence Of Record Supports the Trial Court's Findings and 
Conclusions That the Public Continuously Used the Four Subject Roads 
as Public Thoroughfares For More Than Ten Years 4 
1. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Properly Resolved Conflicting Trial Testimony 4 
a. The Landowners' Testimony Went One Direction 4 
b. The County's Testimony Went The Opposite Direction 5 
c. Out of This Pointed Factual Dispute, The Trial Court 
Decided Who and What To Believe and Made Findings 
and Conclusions Accordingly 6 
d. The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Law to Its Findings 
To Determine that the Subject Roads Were Public Roads 9 
2. The Transcript Demonstrates That Sufficient Competent 
Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Findings 10 
a. Testimony Showing The Public Used the Subject Roads 
As Public Thoroughfares Continuously from The 1950s 
up to The Late 1980s or Early 1990s 11 
b. Testimony Showing That Up Until The Late 1980s if 
Not Later, Members of the Public Did Not Encounter 
Any Locked Gates On The Subject Roads 12 
i 
The Transcript Shows That If The Trial Court Erred at All, It 
Did So By Over-Generously Finding That Prior to the 1990s 
the Landowners Locked The Gates At Various Times In the 
Past For Several Days At A Time 13 
a. Circle Springs Road 13 
b. Ridge Line Road 14 
c. Thorton Hallow Road 14 
d. Parker Canyon Road 14 
e. Four Roads in General 14 
f. Petitioners Brian and Lee Okelberry Turned Out to Be 
Their Own Weakest Evidentiary Links For Establishing 
That Gates Were Locked Prior to the 1980s 16 
However the Controversy Over the Locked Gates May Ete 
Characterized, The Transcript Even More Clearly Supports The 
Trial Court's Findings When Read In Light of Established Utah 
Supreme Court Precedent That Grants Trial Courts Wide 
Discretion in Public Road Dedication Cases 18 
a. Draw Inferences in the Light Most Favorable 
to the Findings 18 
b. Defer to the Trial Court to Resolve Disputed Facts 19 
c. Grant Trial Courts a Fair Degree of Latitude Even in 
Determining the Legal Consequences of the Facts 
They Do Find 21 
d. Consider All Facts Together, Not in Isolation 21 
Instances Where This Court Has Reversed a Trial Court's 
Public Road Determination Are Distinguishable and Go 
Both Ways 21 
ii 
B. The Correct Legal Test To Determine Continuous Public Use 
Does Not Turn On the Mere Erection of Gates, Signs or Locks; 
The Correct Test Focuses on The Extent of Public Travel And Asks 
Was It As Often As the Public Found It Necessary or Convenient 23 
1. Boyer v. Clark 24 
2. Thurman v. Buyrum 24 
3. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo 25 
4. Gllmor v. Carter 25 
5. AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen 26 
C. The Court of Appeals' Balancing Test Is The Best Logical 
Application of This Court's Definition of "Continuous Use/' 
Which is As Often As Convenient and Necessary Or As Often 
As The Public Had Occasion or Chose to Pass 26 
CONCLUSION 28 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
A WINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 
112 P. 3d 1228, 1230, 1231 (Utah App. 2005) 26 
Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 
P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) 9, 10, 19, 25 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 
417 P. 2d 646, 647 (Utah 1966) 9, 18, 19, 21 
Boyer v. Clark, 
326 P. 2d 107 (Utah 1958) 7, 8, 24, 27 
Campbell v. Box Elder County, 
962 P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998) 19, 20 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 
888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) 25 
Gillmor v. Carter, 
391 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964) 25, 26 
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 
942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997) 4, 21-23, 25 
Petersen v. Combe, 
438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968) 21, 22 
Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 
559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) 27 
State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 10, 19 
Thomson v. Condas, 
493 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah 1972) 10, 19 
iv 
Thurman v. Byram, 
626 P.2d 447,449 (Utah 1981) 24, 25 
Utah County v. Butler, 
2006 Ut App 444 20 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 
2006 Utah App., 473 H 18, 153 P.3d 745 26 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, 
744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987) 11 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-104(1) (2006 1, 27 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 10 
v 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
Amicus curiae Utah Association of Counties ("UAC") is a voluntary non-profit 
organization whose directors are selected from the elected county officials of the 29 
counties of Utah. Formed in 1924, UAC assists county commissioners, council members 
and other county officials by lobbying and advocating for federal and state legislative and 
administrative action and at times litigating for judicial decisions and outcomes that are 
beneficial to the counties of Utah and county residents. Counties in Utah are vitally 
interested in maintaining the public nature of the roads which comprise the inventory of 
each county's public transportation system. UAC, on behalf of its member counties who 
maintain thousands of miles of rural county public roads like the one at issue in the 
present case, has a substantial interest in advising the Court as to the proper interpretation 
and application of public road dedication laws. 
The issue framed in this Court's March 15, 2007 Order granting certiorari is 
"Whether the district court and court of appeals erred in their application of the standards 
for ascertaining a continuous use as a public thoroughfare pursuant to the Dedication 
Statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-104(1)." This review will examine the public nature of a 
road in light of asserted periodic interruption of public use in decades past. That will bear 
on the validity of the many thousands of miles of county public land rural road claims 
with which UAC is involved statewide. UAC wishes to advise why the Court of Appeals 
holding presents a workable, practicable solution that best weighs public and private 
1 
interests, a solution that helps counties meet the challenge of maintaining rural public 
transportation systems in harmony with the interests of entities like amicus curiae 
Brigham Young University. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Competent evidence of record supports the trial court's findings and conclusions 
that the public continuously used the four subject roads as public thoroughfares for more 
than ten years. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law properly resolved 
conflicting trial testimony by deciding who and what to believe and entering findings and 
conclusions accordingly. The trial court correctly applied the law to its findings to 
determine that the subject roads were public roads. The trial transcript demonstrates that 
sufficient competent evidence supports the trial court's findings. There was ample 
testimony showing the public used the subject roads as public thoroughfares continuously 
from the 1950s up to the late 1980s or early 1990s. There was also ample testimony 
showing that up until the late 1980s if not later, members of the public did not encounter 
any locked gates on the subject roads and could pass through those gates freely. The 
transcript shows that if the trial court erred at all, it did so by over-generously finding that 
prior to the 1990s the landowners locked the gates at various times in the past for several 
days at a time. Not that it much matters, however, since the trial court still correctly 
found that any such pattern of pre-1990s gate locking did not prevent the public from 
using the subject roads as often as they found it necessary and convenient. 
2 
However the controversy over the locked gates may be characterized, the transcript 
even more clearly supports the trial court's findings when read in light of established 
Utah Supreme Court precedent that grants trial courts wide discretion in public road 
dedication cases. Under this precedent the Court of Appeals correctly drew inferences in 
the light most favorable to the trial court findings, deferred to the trial court to resolve 
disputed facts, granted the trial court a fair degree of latitude to determine the legal 
consequences of the facts it did find, and considered all facts together, not in isolation. 
The correct legal test to determine whether public use of the subject roads was 
continuous does not turn on the mere erection of gates, signs or locks. The correct 
standard focuses on the extent of public travel: did it occur as often as the public found it 
necessary or convenient. The Court of Appeals' balancing test is the best logical 
application of this "necessary and convenient" test. This Court should adopt that analysis 
and affirm. 
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ARGUMENT 
A, Competent Evidence Of Record Supports the Trial Court's Findings and 
Conclusions That the Public Continuously Used the Four Subject Roads as 
Public Thoroughfares For More Than Ten Years 
1. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Properly 
Resolved Conflicting Trial Testimony 
Statements in the trial court's initial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("Initial Findings and Conclusions"), Record ("R.") at 409-420, and Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Order on Motion to Amend Judgment ("Supplemental Findings"), R. 
481-489, can be classified into the following four categories: the testimony and claims 
presented by defendant/petitioners ("the landowners"), the testimony and claims 
presented by plaintiff/respondent ("Wasatch County" or "the County"), the court's actual 
findings of fact, and the court's actual conclusions of law.1 
a. The Landowners' Testimony Went One Direction 
The trial court acknowledged the following testimony as having been adduced by 
the landowners and received at trial: 
Ridge Line Road and Parker Canyon Road were never at any time open to 
public use. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 4 ^  14. R. 417. 
1
 Some of categories overlap and intermingle at times within a given 
paragraph of the Initial Findings and Conclusions and Supplemental Findings, which is 
understandable given the "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous" nature the 
factual and legal requirements at issue herein. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 
307, 311 (Utah 1997). 
4 
Large numbers of people asked permission to use the subject roads. Id, at 4 f^ 15. 
R.417. 
Landowners' employees asked people not to use the subject roads at various 
times. Id, at 4-5 ffl[ 16-17. R. 416-417. Supplemental Findings, at 17. R. 488. 
Gates on the subject roads were generally closed from the beginning of their 
ownership in order to control livestock and restrict travel on the roads. Initial Findings 
and Conclusions, at 5 If 17. R. 416. 
Gates on the subject roads were in place as far back as 1957, but concededly they 
were not always locked and did not prevent travel. Id, at 6 f^ 3. R. 415. 
Beginning in the 1960s gates were "periodically locked for several days at a time" 
and "No Trespassing - Private Property" signs were posted on the gates." Id, at 6 % 3. R. 
415. 
b. The County's Testimony Went The Opposite Direction 
The trial court acknowledged the following testimony as having been adduced by 
the County and received at trial: 
Although the subject roads had no trespassing signs and gates, the gates were not 
locked until the 1990s. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 4 f^ 11-12. R. 417. 
Despite the presence of no-trespassing markers and gates on the subject roads, the 
public was able to freely use those roads continuously for many more than ten years for 
recreational purposes until the gates were locked in the early 1990s. Id. 
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Prior to their being locked, the existence of the gates on the subject roads did not 
interrupt the public's use of the roads. Id., at 4 ^  12. R. 417. 
The persons who used the subject roads were members of the general public 
without any private right to use those roads. Id., at 4 f^ 11. R. 417. 
The landowners between the 1950s and late 1980s asked people not to go on their 
private property adjoining the subject roads, but not until the 1990s did the landowners 
impede traffic on the actual roads themselves. Id, at 4 f^ 13. R. 417. 
Any gates that existed on the subject roads were not locked until the 1990s, and 
once no trespassing signs were posted they seemed to refer only to property abutting the 
roads and not the roads themselves. Id., at 6 f 3. R. 415. 
c. Out of This Pointed Factual Dispute, The Trial Court Decided 
Who and What To Believe and Made Findings and Conclusions 
Accordingly 
The trial court found in relevant part: 
The four subject roads are Circle Springs Road, Thorton Hollow2 Road, Parker 
Canyon Road and Ridge Line Road. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 2 \ 3. R. 419. 
The four subject roads are mountainous roads typically accessed by pickup truck, 
snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles, and they either begin and end at points outside the 
landowners' property or connect with roads that do. Id., at 2 fflf 4-6 and 3^6. R. 418-
Referenced often in the trial transcript as Thorton "Hallow" Road. 
6 
419.3 
In the early 1990s the landowners started selling "trespass permits" to allow 
persons to hunt, gather wood and camp on their property. Id., at 4 \ 18. R. 416. 
In the mid 1990s up through the present, the landowners allowed their land to 
become a private hunting unit, id, at f^ 19, R. 416, allowing private hunters to access the 
land in return for a significant monetary payment. Supplemental Findings, at \ 9. R. 487. 
Beginning in the 1990s, landowners began restricting access to the roads. Id., at f^ 
7. R. 488. 
At various times in the past (no specificity as to the dates or frequency), the 
landowners and their employees have locked these gates for several days at a time, but 
beginning in the 1990s the landowners began locking these gates on a more permanent 
basis. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 6 fflf 3-4, Supplemental Findings, at^ f 5. R. 
415,488. 
The landowners posted "no trespassing signs" at various places along these roads. 
Supplemental Findings, at % 6. R. 488. 
Nevertheless, the facts of the present case are "similar to the facts of Boyer v. 
Clark,4 where the public, though not consisting of a great many persons, made a 
continuous and uninterrupted use of the roads as often as they found it convenient and 
3
 There are duplicate numbered paragraphs 6 and 7 in the Initial Findings, 
one pair on page 2 and the other pair on page 3. R. 418-419. 
4
 326 P. 2d 107 (Utah 1958). 
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necessary. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 6-7 ^ 4. R. 414-415.5 
Taking even the landowners' factual assertions as true concerning gates being 
locked "at various times in the past" "for several days at a time,"6 it is clear that 
5
 The relevant facts in Boyer are: 
The use of the road was not great because comparatively few people had 
need to travel it, but those of the public who had such need, did so. 
326 P.2d 107,108 (Utah 1958). 
Within the past few years prior to the trial of this action in 1956, both 
appellant and respondent have put no trespassing signs on their properties 
and have attempted to charge deer hunters who wanted to use their 
properties. However, no objection was made nor did any of the owners of 
property over which the trail traversed attempt to interfere in the public's 
use until respondent tried to prevent such use a short time before this action 
was commenced. 
Id. at 108-109. 
The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case disclosed that for a period 
exceeding 50 years, the public, even though not consisting of a great many 
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use of Middle Canyon Road, 
in traveling by wagon and other vehicles and by horse from Upton to Grass 
Creek and other points as often as they found it convenient or necessary. 
Id. at 109. 
6
 Given the context of the trial court's statement, "Taking even the 
Defendants' factual assertions as true," Initial Findings and Conclusions, \ 4, R. 415, the 
only logical meaning of that statement is that the trial court takes as true the landowners 
assertion that the gates have been locked "at various times in the past" "for several days 
at a time." The landowners' transparent suggestion that the trial court by this statement 
apparently swallowed as true every other item of testimony adduced by the landowners at 
trial, makes no sense. That suggestion conveniently ignores the overall findings 
themselves and ignores the subject statement's context in juxtaposition to the paragraph 
that preceded it. If the trial court had taken all testimony and claims adduced and asserted 
8 
individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s or early 1990s 
used the road without interruption, they used the roads freely, and through not constantly, 
they used the roads as often as they needed. Id, at 6 ^ f 4. R. 415. 
The individuals who have used the roads did so in their capacity as members of the 
general public, and used the roads as a thoroughfare to public lands and/or for recreation, 
prior to the landowners' locking of the gates in the early 1990s. Id, at 7 1 6, R. 414. 
Starting in 1960 until the early 1990s when the landowners began locking the gates 
and selling hunting permits, the subject roads were accessible and used by the general 
public as often as they found necessary and convenient. Id, at 8 ^ f 7. R. 413. 
d. The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Law to Its Findings To 
Determine that the Subject Roads Were Public Roads 
The trial court made the following conclusions of law: 
There was non-permissive continuous public use of the subject roads as often as 
the public found it convenient and necessary. Initial Findings and Conclusions, at 6-7 ^ 
2-4. R. 414-415. 
by the landowners as true, then the Court's actual written and signed Initial Findings and 
Conclusions and Supplemental Findings wherein the trial court took pains to expressly 
enter so many findings and conclusions in the County's favor, would be nonsensical. 
This Court should not countenance the landowner's suggestion. See Bonner v. Sudbury, 
417 P. 2d 646, 647 (Utah 1966) (Appellate court when reviewing claims that public road 
dedication rulings lack evidentiary support, should "analyze the evidence and whatever 
reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings 
and judgment.") and Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 
1981). 
9 
Prior to the locking of the gates in the early 1990s, members of the general public 
as opposed to adjacent landowners or individuals with permission used the subject roads 
as public thoroughfares to public lands and/or recreation. Id., at 7 Tfl[ 5-6. R. 414. 
The continuous use of the subject roads as public thoroughfares lasted more than a 
period often years, from 1960 until the early 1990s when the landowners began locking 
the gates and selling hunting permits. Id., at 8 ^ f 7. R. 413. 
2 The Transcript Demonstrates That Sufficient Competent Evidence 
Supports the Trial Court's Findings 
Trial court findings are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard set forth 
in Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).7 State v. Pena} 869 P.2d 932,935 (Utah 1994). Given this 
standard, public road dedication trial court findings may not be overturned "unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them." Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 
639 P.2d 211,213 (Utah 1981).8 No legal basis exists for overturning such findings 
unless they go "against the clear weight of evidence" or otherwise cause a reviewing 
7
 Rule 52(a) states in relevant part: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
8
 Moreover, an appellant who challenges trial court findings must marshal 
and recite all facts for the reviewing court, whether or not favorable to their position. 
Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah 1972) (In rejecting challenge to trial court's 
determination that a road had not been subject to ten years continuous public use, Court 
noted that appellants "chose to recite evidence most favorable to its contention to the 
exclusion of other evidence favorable to [respondents], which is not permissable on 
appellate review[.]"). It is doubtful whether the landowners' opening brief satisfies this 
duty. 
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court to "reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Western 
Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 
1377 (Utah 1987). Reading the testimony documented in the following pages of trial 
court transcripts produces a definite and firm conviction that the trial court's findings are 
correct, they are just, they are right, they ferret out who is credible and who is not, and 
they go with the clear weight of evidence: 
a. Testimony Showing The Public Used the Subject Roads As Public 
Thoroughfares Continuously from The 1950s up to The Late 1980s 
or Early 1990s. 
Circle Springs Road: Trial Transcript of June 28, 2004 proceedings ("6-28-04 TR") 
at 31:23-32:23; 33:3-9, 19-24,34:13-15, 19-21, 100:1-
104:14, 105:20-24, 148:6 -149:6, 186:5 -187:22, 190:3-20, 
265:14-267:6,268:12-25. 
Ridge Line Road: 6-28-04 TR at 37:2-5, 37:22 - 38:1, 38:2-18, 38:24 - 39:6, 
106:9 - 107:13,111:17-22, 113:6-9. 119:11 - 121:8, 190:21 -
192:3,269:1 -271:1. 
Thorton Hallow Road: 6-28-04 TR at 41:13 -42:20,42:21 -43:9,107:14- 110:7, 
116:9-117:6,271:25-273:20. 
Parker Canyon Road: 6-28-04 TR at 46:2-47:2, 121:13 - 125:12,274:1-275:10, 
277:12 - 278:11. Trial Transcript of June 29, 2004 
proceedings ("6-29-04 TR") at 74:10 - 76:11. 
11 
The four roads in general: 6-28-04 TR at 15-17. 
b. Testimony Showing That Up Until The Late 1980s if Not Later, 
Members of the Public Did Not Encounter Any Locked Gates 
On The Subject Roads. 
Circle Springs Road: 6-28-04 TR at 35:11-15, 81:7-12, 104:15-18, 187:23 - 188:1, 
267:25 - 268:11, 287:15-21. 6-29-04 TR at 9:25 -10:1, 
63:18-20, 64:6 - 65:18,101:13-16. 
Ridge Line Road: 6-28-04 TR at 39:16-39,40:4-6,14-16, 81:13-16,111:20 -
112:11; 113:20-22, 192:7-8, 271:2-4, cf 314:15-315:1 (there 
could have been locks in 1980's, but we just threw our bikes 
over the fence, climbed over and continued on). 6-29-04 TR 
at 11:10-14, 13:6-9, 104:14-16. 
Thorton Hallow Road: 6-28-04 TR at 43:14-25,118:23-24,273:21-25. 6-29-04 TR 
71:9-10,76. 
Parker Canyon Road: 6-28-04 TR at 47:19-48:4, 125:11-15, 275:11-12,278:12-13. 
6-29-04 TR at 76:12-14. 
The four roads in general: 6-28-04 TR at 64:8-14, 83:20-25. 
At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred for not achieving a "definite and 
firm conviction" that the trial court made a mistake in finding they way it did. Given the 
foregoing testimony, that definite feeling was just not there for the Court of Appeals to 
experience. 
12 
3. The Transcript Shows That If The Trial Court Erred at All, It Did So By 
Over-Generously Finding That Prior to the 1990s the Landowners Locked 
The Gates At Various Times In the Past For Several Days At A Time. 
This point may be academic as the trial court still correctly found that any such 
pattern of pre-1990s gate locking did not prevent the public from using the subject roads 
as often as they found it necessary and convenient. But this Court should be advised that 
the transcript shows evidentiary support is spare and stinting at best for the notion that the 
landowners before the 1990s locked the gates "at various times in the past" "for several 
days at a time." Following is an analysis of the transcript: 
a. Circle Springs Road 
A witness for landowners said a gate on the Circle Springs Road always had a 
chain and lock on it. 6-29-04 TR at 133:25 - 134:3. Yet he admitted that every week the 
gate itself was put up, it was ripped out the next day. 6-29-04 TR at 134:12-14. 
Another witness for landowners said gates on Circle Springs Road were locked, 
but he was never asked by landowners' counsel to specify the dates, frequency and 
duration of such locking. 6-29 TR at 161:11 -19. 
Lee Okelberry, who is not a party but is a brother and uncle to defendants and their 
long time business partner and co-landowner before selling out to them several years prior 
to the 2004 trial, said you could not keep a gate on the Circle Springs Road, that anybody 
was free to use that road whether they asked permission or not. 6-29-04 TR at 193:18 -
194:13,204:16-22,205:12-16. 
13 
b. Ridge Line Road 
A witness for landowners said gates on the Ridge Line Road were locked as far 
back as 20 years. 6-29-04 TR at 160:6-19. 20 years prior to the trial is 1984. That 
testimony does not contradict plaintiffs evidence that the gates were not locked during 
the 1950s, '60s, '70s and early '80s.. 
A subsequently called witness for defendants said when he was on and around the 
subject roads from 1952 to 1957, he never saw locks on any of the seven gates along the 
Ridge Line Road. Trial Transcript of June 30,2004 proceedings ("6-30-04 TR") at 10:3-
10; 15:20-16:1. 
c. Thorton Hallow Road 
The undersigned could be mistaken, but the undersigned represents to this Court 
that upon a careful review of the entire trial transcript he did not detect any testimony 
regarding locks on gates specific to the Thorton Hallow road. 
d. Parker Canyon Road 
A witness for landowners was asked if gates in Parker Canyon Road had ever been 
locked and he said yes. But inexplicably the witness was never asked to state when that 
occurred. 6-29-04 TRat 162:4-9. 
e. Four Roads in General 
Defendants' own counsel said in his opening statement that his clients began to 
lock the gates in the late 1970's. "The evidence will show that those fences and those 
14 
roads have been there continuously since 1957. Not only have there been gates there, but 
they - - Beginning in about the 19, late 1970's they began to lock those gates." 6-28-04 
TR at 8:7-9. (Emphasis added).9 
A current hunting guide on defendants' property said the road gates are locked 
during the hunting season. But again he was never asked to state what years these locks 
were in place. Notably, the witness admitted he has been on and around the property only 
since 1994. 6-29-04 TR at 233:7-23, 237:11-25,238:18-22. 
A former hunting guide on landowners' property from the 1990s to 2001 referred 
to locks being blown off of gates during this time period. 6-29-04 TR at 256:24 - 257:5, 
257:17-18; 260:19. In what is either a transcription error or a mis-speak by trial counsel, 
there is a question and answer exchange with this witness that refers to two locked gates, 
the location of which is not clear from the record, from "1996 to 1990." 6-29 TR at 
267:1-13. By the context of questions that follow, counsel and the witness may have 
been intending to focus on the 196(5-1990 time period. 
Lee Okelberry, a brother and uncle of the petitioner/landowners and their long-
time business partner and co-owner of the subject property before selling out to them 
several years prior to the trial, was called to testify for the landowners. Remarkably, Lee 
Okelberry was not asked once in direct examination if any of the gates on the subject 
9
 Granted this statement by counsel is not evidence, but it sure does not go 
very far to produce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial 
court for finding ten years continuous public use. 
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roads were ever locked. 6-29-04 TR at 172-187. On cross examination, Lee Okelberry 
testified that members of the public got to using the subject roads more and more over the 
years when he was there, to the point that the gates themselves were disappearing. 6-29-
04 TR at 185:19 - 186:23. Lee Okelberry also testified on cross examination that the 
Okelberrys never did lock anybody out of there. 6-29 TR at 186:21-24, 195:24 -196:2-3. 
/ Petitioners Brian and Lee Okelberry Turned Out to Be Their 
Own Weakest Evidentiary Links For Establishing That Gates 
Were Locked Prior to the 1980s. 
Petitioner/landowner Brian Okelberry, son of co-petitioner/landowner Ray 
Okelberry and nephew to prior non-party witness Lee Okelberry, recalls putting one lock 
on a gate once, and that was not even for a boundary access gate to their property but 
rather for a gate in the interior of their property. What is worse, Brian was not asked to 
state when this occurred, i,.e., when he put up the one lock on an interior gate. 6-30-04 
TR at 47:8-21. But Brian does remember that he personally did not put up any no-
trespassing signs until the late 1980s. 6-30-04 at TR 46:24 - 47:7. And when asked when 
to his recollection did anybody first place locks on any of the boundary gates, Brian first 
said it was the 1990s, 6-30-04 at TR 53:8-17, and a few minutes later said it was the 
1980s to his recollection. 6-30-04 at TR 54:18-22. 
Then petitioner Ray Okelberry testified, the dad, the main man from the beginning 
in the Okelberry livestock and land operation. The only indication Ray Okelberry gave to 
suggest the placement of any locks before the 1990s is as follows: simply that he "started" 
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to lock two gates in 1957 or 1958, a gate on the Circle Springs Road and a gate called the 
1080 gate on the Ridge Line Road. 6-30-04 TR at 98:8-18, 135:20 - 136:13. There are 
several astoundingly remarkable points about this testimony: 
First, Ray Okelberry's testimony conclusively and irrefutably excludes 
mention of any locks on the Thorton Hallow Road or the Parker Canyon Road, half of the 
roads even at issue in this appeal. It thus leaves open and unchallenged the notion that 
Parker Canyon Road and Thorton Hallow Road were never locked prior to the 1980's at 
all}" 
Next there is no evidence that the locking of these two gates, which 
"started" in 1957 or 1958, repeated, or endured. No testimony was adduced to indicate 
how many continuous years, or how many years at all, this practice continued. 
Next Ray Okelberry admitted that locking these two gates, for what ever 
years that this occurred, lasted for a week to 10 days while when he was getting ready to 
move the sheep out, as opposed to all summer. 6-30-04 TR at 138:18-20, 139:2-5. 
Finally, the locks were admittedly ineffective to prohibit travel on those 
roads, because Ray Okelberry freely admitted to always having trouble keeping the locks 
there. "They might cut the wire off or they might cut the - 1 don't know how they got 
10
 One would think that Ray Okelberry of all people would testify about locks 
on these roads if they existed. 
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these locks off, but they'd get through the gate." 6-30-04 TR 138:20-24u 
The above-documented dearth of evidence shows the true colors of the trial court's 
charitable finding that the gates were locked "at various times in the past,"12 and it 
strengthens one's conviction that whatever gate locking activities ensued prior to the 
1980s or 1990s, they sure did not defeat ten or more years of public continuous use of the 
four subject roads as often as the public found it necessary and convenient to travel them. 
In the words of this Court: "We are at a loss to understand how it can reasonably be said 
that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings and judgment." Bonner v. 
Sudbury, All P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966). 
4. However the Controversy Over the Locked Gates May Be Characterized, 
The Transcript Even More Clearly Supports The Trial Court's Findings 
When Read In Light of Established Utah Supreme Court Precedent That 
Grants Trial Courts Wide Discretion in Public Road Dedication Cases. 
The following established precedents of this Court disfavor landowners' request to 
upset and micro-manage the role of trial courts in resolving public road dedication 
disputes: 
a. Draw Inferences in the Light Most Favorable to the Findings. 
In reviewing claims that public road dedication rulings lack evidentiary support, it 
is the appellate court's "duty to analyze the evidence and whatever reasonable inferences 
11
 Petitioner Ray Okelberry's critical admission is embedded in the tail end of 
an answer that consumed 34 lines of transcript before his counsel interrupted to say: 
"Okay. Mr. Okelberry, I think you've answered the question." 6-30-04 TR at 139:6-7. 
12
 Like the Chicago Cubs winning the pennant. 
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may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment." 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P. 2d 646, 647 (Utah 1966); Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranches, P. 2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981). Before overturning trial court findings, the 
reviewing court must decide that the record does not adequately support the findings, 
"resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
b. Defer to the Trial Court to Resolve Disputed Facts. 
"[W]here there is dispute over whether a public use is established, determination 
of the facts and resolution of the issue is primarily the responsibility of the trial court." 
Bonner v. Sudbury, All P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966). "The testimony of one credible 
witness, if believed by the court or jury, is sufficient upon which to base a finding of 
fact." Id. "[I]t is the prerogtive of the arbiter of the facts in our judicial system to believe 
or disbelieve testimony of a controverisal bent[.]" Thomson v. Condas, 493 P.2d 639, 
640 (Utah 1972). 
The Court of Appeals in Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah App. 
1998), upheld the trial court's determination that the subject road was not a public road, 
where the evidence supported a finding that the road was locked at all times as a general 
rule except for a brief period each hunting season where the landowner opened the gate 
for a brief period to let hunters access Forest Service ground. Id. at 807. 
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"Here, the trial court explicitly found the public had not been 
able to use Ridge Road as often as they found it necessary or 
convenient. On the contrary, the trial court found Ridge Road 
was generally barred by a locked gate[.]" 
Id. at 809. Whereas the gate in Campbell was generally locked, by contrast the gates on 
the subject roads in the present case were generally unlocked for a number of decades 
(assuming the gates were even standing - which they often were not). 
The Court of Appeals in Utah County v. Butler, 2006 Ut App 444 declined to 
overturn the trial court's determination that the subject road had been used continuously 
by the public for at least ten years. The Court held it was within the discretion of the trial 
court to find that the gates in question were generally unlocked from about 1925 until 
1980 and were used merely to restrict the travel of livestock, not people, id. at \ 15, even 
through there was conflicting trial court testimony regarding the status and purpose of 
gates along the subject road and whether and how often those gates made the road 
impassable. Id. at ^ f 12. "We are not in a position to closely scrutinize the factual 
findings of the trial court in public thoroughfare dedication cases Therefore, unless 
the findings of fact are clearly unsupported by the record, we will seek only to apply the 
trial court's factual findings to the law of abandonment and public dedication." Id. at % 
13. 
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c. Grant Trial Courts a Fair Degree of Latitude Even in 
Determining the Legal Consequences of the Facts They Do 
Find. 
"Historically, we have given trial courts a fair degree of latitude in determining the 
legal consequences under [the public road dedication statute] of facts found by the court.. 
. . . Granting [such] discretion to the trial court is appropriate under that section, as its 
legal requirements, other than the ten-year requirement, are highly fact dependent and 
somewhat amorphous." Heber City Corp v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Utah 1997) 
(Citations omitted). 
d. Consider All Facts Together, Not in Isolation. 
"We have no doubt that each of those facts, if considered separately, could be 
rationalized as not proving a public street. But all of the facts should be considered 
together . . . " Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1966) 
5. Instances Where This Court Has Reversed a Trial Court's Public Road 
Determination Are Distinguishable and Go Both Ways. 
In Petersen v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968) the Court reversed a trial court 
judgment declaring a road to be a public highway. But that decision rests on three factors 
that are distinguishable from the present case. First the plaintiffs in Petersen did not 
plead that the road was used as a public thoroughfare nor plead ten years of public 
continuous use. Id. at 546. Here Wasatch County has plainly and consistently throughout 
this litigation plead, litigated, adduced evidence and argued that the subject roads are a 
public thoroughfare that have undergone more than ten years of continuous public use. 
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Secondly, given that individuals who own property in the area of the subject road "cannot 
be considered members of the public generally, as that term generally is used in 
dedication by user statutes," id, the Petersen Court had trouble with the plaintiffs' failure 
to allege that members of the public other than property owners in the area even used the 
road. In the present case, several persons who are not adjacent landowners but general 
members of the public testified to decades of uninterrupted road use by themselves, their 
friends and family and other members of the public. Thirdly, the Petersen plaintiffs' own 
witness agreed that the land at the end of the subject road had no allure for the public. Id. 
at 547-548. Yet in the present case it is undisputed that the subject roads lead to publicly 
open and accessible Forest Service property, publicly favored camping, hunting and 
sightseeing destinations, and work locations for Forest Service livestock permitees. 
This Court has also reversed a trial court finding that a road is not a public 
highway. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). There the record of 
uncontroverted evidence satisfied the technical requirements of the public road statute. 
All the trial court in that case could do to try to get around that evidence is cite some 
general unspecified interest in "fairness and justice." This Court rejected that analysis: 
"Once the technical provisions of that [public road dedication] section have been 
satisfied, the road is a public highway. The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." 
Mat 313. 
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Under the authority of Heber City, it is arguable that the trial court in the present 
case would have committed reversible error had it legally concluded that the subject roads 
were not dedicated to the public, given its explicit findings of continuous, decades-long 
uninterrupted non-permissive public use of the roads by non-landowners. 
B. The Correct Legal Test To Determine Continuous Public Use Does Not 
Turn On the Mere Erection of Gates, Signs or Locks; The Correct Test 
Focuses on The Extent of Public Travel And Asks Was It As Often As 
the Public Found It Necessary or Convenient 
The focus is on the extent and continuity of public travel, not on some per se test 
for a gate, or a lock, or a sign that could produce a multiplicity of different effects and 
outcomes depending on the road case and fact pattern. Was there something the 
landowners did that interrupted the established flow of public travel, whatever that 
established flow was? If so who cares what that "something" is. No device is too small 
or demure to factor for its possible effects on the continuity of public travel; no device too 
big or intimidating to dispense the required examination of public travel. In all the fuss 
over the presence or absence of gates, locks and signs, we must take care not to look in 
the wrong end of the telescope. 
That correct legal test is a fact intensive, case-by-case inquiry, incapable of one-
line jurisprudential acid tests that make, for example, a road per se public if it has a gate 
but the gate is not locked, or per se private if it has merely an unlocked gate. Not that 
those items are not factors, but that they are only factors as opposed to per se legal 
standards in themselves on which the public or private nature of a road mechanically rises 
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or falls. 
Thus the bottom line inquiry which amicus Brigham Young University should not 
try to evade, is a common sense everyday factual case-by-case inquiry into whether in fact 
on all the facts and circumstances, public passage and travel did or did not occur as often 
as the public found it necessary and convenient. The safe, easy-to-apply standard B YU is 
looking for, is to look through the right end of the telescope and record the impact of its 
actions on the established pattern of public travel. Consider the following authorities in 
support of this proposition: 
/. Boyer v. Clark 
The Court in Boyer v. Clark found it remarkable that while the land owner posted 
no trespassing signs, "no objection was made nor did any of the owners of property over 
which the trail traversed attempt to interfere with public use. Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 
107, 108-09 (Utah 1958). 
2. Thurman v. Buyrum 
The admitted placement of no trespassing signs on the road does not compel 
reversal of the trial court's public continuous public use determination, where "[t]he signs 
did not specifically refer to the use of the roadway . . . and their language was consistent 
with an intent to prevent the public from leaving the roadway and entering onto adjacent 
private properties." Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). 
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Moreover the Court in Thurman upheld the trial court's continuous public use 
determination despite testimony that some of the use by non-property owners was with 
permission, because "there was clear and convincing evidence of frequent and general use 
of the road without defendants' permission." Id. 
3. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo 
The Court in Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 
1995) distinguished Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 450 (1981) by noting that there the 
general public was never asked to stay off the road; whereas in Draper City the general 
public was directed to stay off and the police were often called in to prevent passage. Id., 
at 1101. 
4. Gllmor v. Carter 
In Gillmor v. Carter, 391 P.2d 426 (Utah 1964), the Court placed importance on 
the placement of signs and gates, whether they actually prevented public passage or not. 
This is so because the Court still paid homage to the now-abandoned requirement that 
there must be evidence of landowner intent to dedicate the road to the public. Id. at 427-
28.13 The Court, moreover, found equally important the undisputed fact that practically 
13
 There is no need to prove the landowner's intent to dedicate the road to the 
public. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211,213 (Utah 1981), 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995), Thurman v. Bryam, 
626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P. 2d 307, 311 (Utah 
1997) ("We have subsequently abandoned interpreting into the language of the statute the 
requirement that the owner must consent to the dedication." 
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since the road's inception the landowners had entered into formal agreements granting 
permissive use of the road to duck clubs and since then litigated a number of lawsuits to 
assert the private nature of the road. On these two considerations (the now defunct 
landowner intent requirement and the landowners' consistent behavior form the near 
inception of the road), the Court agreed on the undisputed facts that no evidence of 
landowner intent to dedicate a public road existed of record. Id., at 428. 
J. A WINC Corp. v. Simonsen 
Despite 1996-97 era obstructions which the trial court found effectively prevented 
further public travel on a mountainous, unimproved road over private property near Forest 
Service ground, the trial court's determination that the road was dedicated to the public is 
supported by the testimony of four individuals who did not own land in the vicinity of the 
road and never asked or received permission, but who nevertheless seasonally used the 
road every year "significantly more than ten years before" those obstructions, and who 
commonly encountered other public users on the road during their time of use. AWINC 
Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P. 3d 1228, 1230, 1231 (Utah App. 2005). 
C. The Court of Appeals5 Balancing Test Is The Best Logical Application of This 
Court's Definition of "Continuous Use," Which is As Often As Convenient 
and Necessary Or As Often As The Public Had Occasion or Chose to Pass. 
The Court of Appeals balanced the duration and frequency of an road obstruction 
against the frequency and volume of public use. Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 
Utah App, 473 If 18, 153 P.3d 745. This balancing fits well with this Court's "necessary 
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and convenient" test, defined as follows: For public use of a road to be continuous under 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2006), it need not consist of a great many persons or 
necessarily occur every day; rather, it should occur as often as the public finds it 
"necessary and convenient." Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958) (reversing 
trial court's ruling that road was not public, because undisputed testimony showed that 
while public use of road "was not great because comparatively few people had need to 
travel over i t , . . . those of the public who had such need, did so." Id. at 108). An 
accepted variation on the "necessary and convenient" standard is to inquire whether the 
public used the road as often as it "had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is 
not interruption." Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977). 
The Court of Appeals' balancing test naturally flows from this Court's "convenient 
and necessary" standard, because the "as often as convenient and necessary" notion can 
only be gaged and understood against the established volume and nature of use on the 
subject road - whether it is a busy urban street traveled by a high volume of traffic daily 
as in BYU's case, or a remote mountainous traveled infrequently and sporadically as in 
the present case. On the one hand, one day's documented and carefully observed closure 
of BYU's busy urban streets with their collective daily tally of 61,000 cars,14 will 
obviously show that the public did not use those roads as often as they chose or had 
occasion to pass. On the other hand, a several day locking of two gates on two of the four 
14
 BYU's Amicus Curiae Brief herein at page 4. 
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lonely remote mountainous roads at issue in this case once each summer in order to move 
sheep, with no telling how long those locks even stay on there, would not, and on the 
record below did not, bar the public from using those roads from the 1950's to the late 
1980's or early 1990fs as often as the public found it convenient and necessary to pass. 
Thus the "convenient and necessary" test, applied as it was through the Court of 
Appeals' balancing analysis, is inherently flexible enough to adapt to BYU's situation or 
to that of a rural county. One must measure the "as often as convenient and necessary" 
test against the volume of use - whether it is busy urban or remote mountainous. That is 
not terribly difficult. BYU could easily meet that test with one day's closure of its roads, 
just by statistically and scientifically deducing that because of that one day closure, 
61,000 drivers suddenly had their routine interfered with, i.e, they "chose or had 
occasion" to travel the BYU roads but could not. 
CONCLUSION 
The key to resolving this case in a way that addresses all concerns is to key on the 
notion of interference with the established pattern and history of public use. Did 
Petitioner Okelberrys' actions interfere with the public's pattern and history of use of 
these four roads? The trial court was on solid footing in ruling no, not before the late 
1980fs or 1990's. Does BYU's annual brief closure of its roads interfere with the 
established pattern of heavy urban traffic there. Clearly it would. For these reasons, the 
Court should adopt the Court of Appeals' analysis, which is really a straightforward 
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application of this Court's established "necessary and convenient" test, and affirm. 
DATED THIS 2nd day of July, 2007. 
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